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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-1289 
___________ 
 
SHAHER ALZAARIR, 
                                      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                    Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A95-820-824) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and  
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2011) 
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Manuel F. Rios, Esq. 
Rios & Cruz  
811 First Avenue 
Suite 200 
Seattle, WA 98104 
                           Counsel for Petitioner 
 
(Shelley Goad, Esq. 
(Julia J. Tyler, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
                                    Counsel for Respondent 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Shaher Alzaarir, a Palestinian citizen who was born in 
the West Bank when it was under Jordanian control,
1 
entered 
the United States in 2001 as a visitor.  In October 2002, the 
                                                 
1
Although the Notice to Appear charged Alzaarir as a native 
and citizen of Jordan, and the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
referred to him as possibly stateless, Alzaarir testified that he 
is a Palestinian citizen, and both parties describe him this way 
in their briefs.    
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Government charged Alzaarir with removability for 
overstaying his visa.  Alzaarir conceded the charge, and 
through his attorney, Yasser Helal, he sought asylum, 
withholding, and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture.  In September 2003, the IJ denied his applications 
and ordered Alzaarir removed to Jordan.  Alzaarir, still 
represented by Helal, appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  On December 27, 2004, the BIA affirmed 
without opinion the IJ‟s decision.  The BIA granted Alzaarir 
30 days in which to depart voluntarily.      
 
 Meanwhile, in May 2004, Alzaarir married a United 
States citizen and moved to Seattle from Pennsylvania.  On 
advice from Helal and an attorney in Seattle, he filed Forms I-
130 (Visa Petition), I-485 (Application to Adjust Status), and 
I-765 (Application for Employment Authorization).  He also 
faxed copies of the I-130 and I-485 forms to Helal so that he 
could “close out the asylum case.”  In January 2005, Alzaarir 
received his work permit; around the same time, he received 
notice to appear for an interview about his marriage.  In 
February 2005, when Helal advised him that he risked arrest 
if he went to the interview, Alzaarir called the BIA‟s 
automated number and learned of the BIA‟s December 2004 
decision.  Alzaarir and his wife went to the interview on 
March 31, 2005, where the visa petition was approved.            
 
 On March 25, 2005, Helal submitted a motion to 
reopen to the BIA on Alzaarir‟s behalf.  On May 17, 2005, 
the BIA denied the motion for the failure to make a prima 
facie showing of eligibility for relief.  The BIA noted that 
Alzaarir did not submit an I-485.  The BIA also held that 
Alzaarir was barred from adjusting his status because he did 
not voluntarily depart before the deadline to do so, January 
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26, 2005 (and he did not file his motion to reopen before then, 
either).  In a footnote, the BIA noted that although Helal 
submitted the motion, he did not enter an appearance, so the 
BIA treated Alzaarir as proceeding pro se.  The BIA mailed 
the decision to an address in Brooklyn where Alzaarir lived 
before moving to Pennsylvania, R. 80, although the BIA had 
previously mailed a notice in the reopening proceedings to 
Alzaarir‟s former Pennsylvania address, R. 109.  (Alzaarir 
states that he sent a letter to the BIA informing him of his 
new Seattle address, but he does not describe the official 
change of address form and none appears in the record from 
that time period). 
 
 In June 2005, Alzaarir received a letter ordering him to 
report for removal.  He then hired a new attorney, Eric Lin, to 
reopen his asylum case.  In his brief, Alzaarir states that Lin 
worked to reopen his case “proceeding on representations 
from the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] attorneys 
that DHS would agree to reopening as long as the background 
checks were clear.”  Petitioner‟s Brief 10.  However, in the 
agency, Alzaarir described Lin‟s work as tenacious but 
ultimately unsuccessful attempts over three years to get an 
agreement to joint reopening.  R. 30.  Alzaarir also argued 
before the agency that “evidence shows that the DHS trial 
attorneys in New York agreed to the motion to reopen, 
contingent on background checks being favorable.”  Id.  
However, the evidence provided was a December 26, 2007 e-
mail from Lin with the subject “joint motion status?” and a 
message that Lin had not heard from DHS attorney David 
Cheng “regarding this matter” and asking him to let him 
know the reason for the delay.  R. 97.  Lin also stated in his e-
mail that Cheng‟s “last word on this was that you would agree 
to reopen some background checks.”  Id.  Cheng wrote back 
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on December 7, 2007, apologizing for not getting back to Lin 
sooner, and stating that “things with the background check 
are just taking a little longer than expected.”  Id.  He also told 
Lin, “I will stay on top of it and advise you as soon as we 
have some sort of resolution.”  Id.     
 
 In May 2007, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officers arrested Alzaarir.  He was detained until he was 
released under an order of supervision in August 2007.   
Thereafter (in his brief, Alzaarir gives the date as August 
2008, but he did not provide a date to the agency), Alzaarir 
hired his present counsel to pursue the joint motion to reopen.  
Counsel tried to get DHS to agree to a joint motion to reopen 
until March 2009, when DHS stated that it would not join in 
the motion.   
 
 On August 10, 2009, Alzaarir, through his current 
counsel, filed his second motion to reopen, alleging 
ineffective assistance of Helal.  Alzaarir alleged that Helal (1) 
filed a deficient appeal brief with the BIA; (2) failed to file a 
motion to remand based on Alzaarir‟s marriage; (3) failed to 
file a motion to reopen before the end of the voluntary 
departure period; (4) failed to notify Alzaarir that his agency 
appeal had been dismissed; and (5) filed a deficient motion to 
reopen with the BIA.  Alzaarir also stated that he substantially 
complied with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  He sought equitable tolling of the 
time and number limitations on motions to reopen.  He also 
argued that the BIA should exercise its authority to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte.   
 
 The BIA denied Alzaarir‟s motion as time- and 
number-barred.  The BIA held that Alzaarir failed to show 
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that he had acted with the reasonable diligence necessary for 
an award of equitable tolling.  The BIA highlighted the fact 
that, in June 2005, Alzaarir learned that he had been ordered 
removed, became “skeptical” of Helal‟s advice, and hired 
Lin.  The BIA noted that no claim of ineffective assistance 
was made against Lin, who tried without success for three 
years to persuade DHS to file a joint motion to reopen.  The 
BIA also observed that Alzaarir did not reveal when he 
consulted with his current counsel.  However, the BIA noted, 
DHS notified counsel in March 2009 that it would not join in 
a joint motion, but the motion to reopen was not filed until 
August 10, 2009.  The BIA also declined to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte. 
 
 Alzaarir submits a petition for review of the BIA‟s 
decision.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a).  Review of the BIA‟s decision to deny a motion to 
reopen is under a highly deferential abuse of discretion 
standard.
2
  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The discretionary decision is not disturbed unless it is 
found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See id.    
 
 We will deny the petition for review because we 
                                                 
2We do not consider the BIA‟s decision not to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte.  First, it does not appear that Alzaarir 
challenges that decision.  Second, in any event, that decision 
is a discretionary decision beyond our jurisdiction.  See Calle-
Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to 
sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this 
court is without jurisdiction to review a decision declining to 
exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.”)   
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cannot say the BIA‟s decision was arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.  An alien faces number and time limitations 
on filing motions to reopen.  Generally, an alien may file only 
one motion to reopen.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (listing 
an exception not relevant here).  Also, most motions to 
reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the 
final administrative decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Alzaarir presented his second motion 
to reopen to the BIA more than four and a half years after the 
BIA affirmed the IJ‟s order in his case.   
 
 The time limit for filing a motion to reopen is subject 
to equitable tolling, and perhaps the numerical limit is as 
well.  See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 
2005); Luntungan v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 449 
F.3d 551, 557 & n.15 (3d Cir. 2006).  Ineffective assistance 
of counsel can serve as a basis for equitable tolling if 
substantiated and accompanied by a showing of due 
diligence.  See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.2d 248, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Due diligence must be exercised over the entire 
period for which tolling is desired.  See Rashid v. Mukasey, 
533 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).  “This includes both the 
period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was 
or should have been discovered and the period from that point 
until the motion to reopen is filed.”  Id.  
 
 Alzaarir requested tolling because of Helal‟s alleged 
ineffectiveness, which he discovered in June 2005, years 
before he filed his second motion to reopen.  At that point, 
when he realized he had been ordered removed, he did hire 
another attorney, Lin.  However, Lin, against whom Alzaarir 
has not made any allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, did not file a motion to reopen.  Lin may have tried 
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to persuade DHS to agree to a joint motion to reopen to avoid 
the time and number limitations on motions to reopen, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).  
However, an alien who delays filing a motion to reopen, 
while awaiting DHS‟s response to his counsel‟s request to file 
a joint motion to reopen, until the deadline is past generally is 
not entitled to equitable tolling.  See Valeriano v. Gonzales, 
474 F.3d 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2007).     
 
 Alzaarir argues in his brief that he was not merely 
waiting for a response to his request like the alien in 
Valeriano.  He argues that he was exercising diligence 
because he was relying on representations from DHS that it 
would join in a motion to reopen if his background checks did 
not reveal anything negative.  He states that evidence in the 
record supports his claim.  Courts have allowed equitable 
tolling of the time period for filing a motion to reopen where 
the Government has misled a petitioner about what course of 
action to follow.  See, e.g., Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 
1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit also has intimated that tolling “might be 
justified” where counsel for the Government tells an alien‟s 
counsel who was contemplating filing a motion to reopen, 
“„don‟t do anything yet, we may agree [to a joint motion], 
hold off.‟”  Valeriano, 474 F.3d at 674 (citing Socop-
Gonzalez).  Accordingly, if the Government really made 
representations that it was going to agree to a joint motion, 
tolling might be appropriate even though the representations 
could only be considered in evaluating the diligence of the 
petitioner in this case.
 3
   
                                                 
3
The Government asks us not to consider an argument for 
tolling based on reliance because it was not presented to the 
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 However, despite the petitioner‟s claims, the BIA was 
not presented with proof of a conditional promise of a joint 
motion or evidence of the situation for which the Valeriano 
court suggested tolling may be appropriate.  As we described 
in more detail above, Alzaarir informed the BIA that Lin 
worked hard to get an agreement but was ultimately 
unsuccessful.  In the agency, he also stated he had evidence of 
an agreement, but the evidence he presented – the e-mail 
exchange between Lin and Cheng from December 2007 – did 
not show that an agreement had been reached.  Furthermore, 
the BIA considered that even when DHS informed Alzaarir‟s 
current counsel that DHS would not join a joint motion, it 
was not until several months later that Alzaarir filed his 
second motion to reopen.     
 
 Given the record in this case, the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that Alzaarir did not exercise the 
diligence necessary to win equitable tolling and in 
consequently denying his motion to reopen.  Accordingly, we 
will deny the petition for review.         
                                                                                                             
agency.  We consider the argument only in the context it was 
and is presented, namely, as support for diligence under the 
circumstances.  
